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Tournament organisers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be strictly
better off by exerting a lower effort. However, the European qualification tourna-
ments for recent FIFA soccer World Cups are known to violate this requirement,
which inspires our study on the incentive compatibility of similar group-based
qualification systems. Theorems listing the sufficient and necessary conditions of
strategy-proofness are provided and applied to classify several soccer qualification
tournaments for FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships. Two
reasonable mechanisms are proposed to solve the problem of incentive incompatibil-
ity: the first is based on abolishing the anonymity of the matches discarded in the
comparison of teams from different groups, while the second involves a rethinking of
the seeding procedure. Our results have useful implications for the governing bodies
of major sports.
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1 Introduction
Incentive compatibility is a crucial concept of mechanism design at least since the famous
Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), which
states that any fair (non-dictatorial) voting rule is susceptible to strategic voting: there
always exists a voter who can achieve a more favourable outcome by being insincere in
the presence of more than two alternatives. The violation of strategy-proofness may have
unwelcome implications such as a governing coalition of parties losing seats by getting
more votes (Tasna´di, 2008), or a journal improving its ranking by making additional fake
citations to other journals (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2009).
This issue can be even more essential in professional sports where contestants should
exert costly efforts and the tournaments involve high-stake decisions that are familiar to
all agents (Kahn, 2000). Consequently, all sporting contests should provide players with
appropriate incentives to perform (Szymanski, 2003).
While some scholars may argue that sports are a somewhat frivolous topic compared
to most other industries, it is of great interest to a high number of people (Wright, 2014).
For example, the final of the 2010 FIFA World Cup has been watched by about half of
the humans who were alive on its day (Palacios-Huerta, 2014).2 Since sports is also a
huge business with billion dollars of turnover, the optimal design of tournaments poses
an important theoretical problem for both economics (Szymanski, 2003) and operations
research (Scarf et al., 2009).
Furthermore, it seems that the analysis of problems from sports can also add something
for economists. Penalty kicks in soccer provide an excellent environment to test mixed
strategies (Chiappori et al., 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003), while penalty shootouts (Apesteg-
uia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Kocher et al., 2012; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Vandebroek
et al., 2018; Arrondel et al., 2019), multi-stage chess contests (Gonza´lez-Dı´az and Palacios-
Huerta, 2016), and tennis tiebreaks (Magnus and Klaassen, 1999; Cohen-Zada et al., 2018)
have inspired research on the effect of the order of actions in sequential contests. Revenue
sharing in sports can contribute to the development of allocation rules (Bergantin˜os and
Moreno-Ternero, 2019). Somewhat surprisingly, even macroeconomics may benefit from
the analysis of sports data, for example, Krause and Szymanski (2019) use the performance
of national soccer teams to test convergence across countries and the presence of the
“middle income trap”.
The enterprise of exploring sports rules from the perspective of strategy-proofness is
still in its infancy, and much remains to be done. Incentive incompatibility sometimes
originates from the fact that being ranked lower in a given (group) stage leads to facing a
more preferred competitor in the subsequent (knock-out) stage, which means an advantage
in terms of expected probability. For example, Pauly (2014) develops a mathematical
model of such manipulation in round-robin subtournaments and derives an impossibility
theorem, while Vong (2017) considers the strategic manipulation problem in multistage
tournaments and shows that only the top-ranked player can be allowed to qualify from
each group in order to make any equilibrium ranking of qualifying players immune to
manipulation.
It is also a well-known fact that sports using player drafts with the traditional set-up
of reverse order can make losing a profitable strategy (Taylor and Trogdon, 2002; Balsdon
et al., 2007). This means a serious problem in the National Basketball Association (NBA),
2 FIFA stands for Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association, it is the international governing
body of soccer.
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the men’s professional basketball league in North America, where such “tanking” even
influences the betting markets (Soebbing and Humphreys, 2013). Fornwagner (2019) gives
probably the first evidence that there is a concrete strategy behind losing, while Lenten
(2016) and Lenten et al. (2018) propose an alternative draft-pick allocation policy and
evaluate it via a quasi-natural experiment.
These issues and a plethora of similar potential and actual cases (Kendall and Lenten,
2017) demonstrate that sports administrators often place insufficient resources towards
avoiding incentive incompatibility, although this is against the spirit of the game and a
misaligned tournament design can easily lead to outrage among consumers.
Here we focus on a potentially more serious problem when a team is strictly better off
by losing, that is, the manipulation of a match is completely risk-free. The first academic
paper addressing this issue is Dagaev and Sonin (2018), which proves that tournament
systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knock-out tournaments with noncumulative
prizes, usually violate strategy-proofness in the above sense. Their main result reveals the
incentive incompatibility of the qualification for the UEFA Europa League, the second-tier
competition of European club soccer, before the 2015/16 season.3 A follow-up work (Csato´,
2019) identified the same problem in the qualification for the UEFA Champions League,
the most prestigious club competition in European soccer, across the three seasons played
between 2016 and 2019.
In particular, the current paper discusses the incentive (in)compatibility of group-
based qualification systems—a fundamentally different setting from the multiple qualifiers
analysed in Dagaev and Sonin (2018). This design has been used in the qualification
tournaments for two prominent soccer competitions, the FIFA World Cup (in the European
Zone) and UEFA European Championship, among others. While the violation of strategy-
proofness by some recent series has already been recognised (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013;
Csato´, 2017a, 2018), none of these works provide a mathematical model generalising the
mere observation, as well as no strategy-proof mechanisms are suggested.
Thus our standalone contributions can be summarised as follows: (1) the application
of the same monotonic ranking for each group including the repechage group (where
some teams playing in different groups are compared) is proved to be insufficient for
the strategy-proofness of the whole group-based qualification system unless the set of
matches considered in the repechage group is chosen appropriately; (2) theorems listing
the sufficient and necessary conditions of incentive compatibility are provided and applied
to identify nine real-world qualification systems were susceptible to manipulation; (3) two
different mechanisms are proposed for solving the problem of misaligned incentives.
An intuitive interpretation of the main message is that ranking a set of teams in
different pools on a secondary basis along a common denominator is challenging if the size
of those pools is not uniform.4 In finding a way around it, the criteria (each criterion and
their order) for ranking some teams in the secondary sense must be identical to that used
in the primary sense, in the pools themselves. Otherwise, manipulation remains possible
in certain situations.
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 describes the
motivating real-world observation, the European qualification tournament for the 2018
3 UEFA stands for Union of European Football Associations, it is the administrative body of soccer in
Europe, although some member states are (partly) located in Asia.
4 A related problem is when not the size but the strength of the pools is different, which is not
addressed here as being a softer criterion. See Csato´ (2017b) for a discussion of how to take the varying
strength of opponents into account in the ranking of Swiss-system tournaments that are widely used in
chess.
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FIFA World Cup, and outlines an incentive incompatible scenario in this framework.
Section 3 builds and analyses the formal mathematical model of this design, which is
applied to examine the strategy-proofness of some recent qualification tournaments from
soccer in Section 4. Section 5 recommends incentive compatible mechanisms, while
Section 6 concludes.
2 A real-world example: the 2018 FIFA World Cup
qualification tournament (UEFA)
The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA) was the European section
of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers of national soccer teams, which are members of
UEFA. Russia automatically qualified as a host, therefore—after Gibraltar and Kosovo
became FIFA members in May 2016—54 teams entered the qualification process for the
13 slots available in the final tournament.
The format of the competition, confirmed by the UEFA Executive Committee meeting
on 22-23 March 2015 in Vienna, is the following:
∙ Group stage (first round): Nine groups of six teams each, playing home-and-away
round-robin matches. The winners of each group qualify for the 2018 FIFA World
Cup, and the eight best runners-up advance to the play-offs (second round).
∙ Play-offs (second round): The eight best second-placed teams from the group
stage are paired and each pair plays home-and-away matches over two legs. The
four winners qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
We focus on the first round, where the tie-breaking rules are (FIFA, 2016, Article 20.6):
(1) greatest number of points obtained in all group matches (with three points for a win,
one point for a draw and no points for a defeat); (2) goal difference in all group matches;
and (3) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches.5 Further tie-breaking rules
will play no role in our discussion.
The choice of the eight best second-placed teams is not addressed in FIFA (2016), and
we were not able to find the relevant regulation. However, according to a FIFA Media
Release (FIFA, 2017b), which is reinforced by an earlier UEFA press release (UEFA, 2016):
“[. . . ] the eight best runners-up will be decided by ranking criteria as stated in the 2018
FIFA World Cup Regulations, namely points, goal difference, goals scored, goals scored
away from home and disciplinary ranking, with the results against teams ranked 6th not
being taken into account.” AFC (2015) illustrates the ranking of second-placed teams when
some group matches are discarded.
Thus the ranking of runners-up strictly follows tie-breaking in groups, with the crucial
difference of discarding two matches played against the last-placed team of the group. It
turns out that this, seemingly minor, modification has serious unintended consequences
because it allows for possible manipulation of the European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA
World Cup.
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, our starting observation has some history
in academic research. The misaligned incentives have probably been revealed first by a
column in the case of the European qualification tournament for the 2014 FIFA World
Cup (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013). Dagaev and Sonin (2018, p. 1143) states that: “Still, the
5 Strangely, it is not described explicitly that greater goal difference is preferred.
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problem of misaligned incentives is not restricted to national tournaments. For example,
competition rules of the European qualification tournament for the 2014 FIFA World Cup
in Brazil suffered from the same problem. And the “perverse incentives” situation was not
merely a theoretical possibility. Two months before the end of the tournament, with 80%
of games completed, there still was a scenario under which a team might need to achieve
a draw instead of winning to go to Brazil.” According to Csato´ (2018), France had an
incentive to kick two own goals on its last match against Israel in the UEFA Euro 1996
qualifying tournament.
Example 2.1. There was a situation with a positive probability in the 2018 FIFA World
Cup qualification tournament (UEFA), after four-fifths of all matches were over, under
which Bulgaria might need to play a draw instead of winning against Luxembourg on the
last matchday of 10 October 2017.
We generate hypothetical results for the last two matchdays in Group A but use the
actual results in the other eight groups. It is worth noting that all teams play one match
home and one away on the last two matchdays, which is not true for two subsequent
matchdays chosen arbitrarily.
Table 1: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament, UEFA Group A—Results
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
The positions are given according to the matches already played.
The home team is in the row, the away team (represented by its position) is in the column.
The dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017.
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 France — 2-1 4-0 4-1 0-0 10 Oct
2 Sweden 2-1 — 1-1 3-0 7 Oct 4-0
3 Netherlands 0-1 10 Oct — 3-1 5-0 4-1
4 Bulgaria 7 Oct 3-2 2-0 — 4-3 1-0
5 Luxembourg 1-3 0-1 1-3 10 Oct — 1-0
6 Belarus 0-0 0-4 7 Oct 2-1 1-1 —
(b) Hypothetical match results of the last two matchdays
The last row shows an alternative result, obtained if Bulgaria manipulates.
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Sweden Luxembourg 0-4
7 October 2017 Belarus Netherlands 7-0
7 October 2017 Bulgaria France 8-0
10 October 2017 France Belarus 1-0
10 October 2017 Luxembourg Bulgaria 0-1
10 October 2017 Netherlands Sweden 3-0
10 October 2017* Luxembourg* Bulgaria* 1-1*
Table 1 shows a possible scenario in Group A. While some results of Table 1.b may be
unreasonable, like Belarus defeating the Netherlands by 7-0, they are necessary to create
the conditions for manipulation. Nevertheless, this set of match results had a positive
probability after eight matchdays were over.
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Table 2: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament, UEFA Group A—Standings
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Lost; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
The last row contains the second-placed team’s adjusted results for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the sixth-placed team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017b).
(a) Baseline standing with the runner-up results
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 6 2 2 16 13 3 20
2 Bulgaria 6 0 4 22 17 5 18
3 Sweden 5 1 4 18 14 4 16
4 Netherlands 5 1 4 19 18 1 16
5 Belarus 2 2 6 11 17 -6 8
6 Luxembourg 2 2 6 11 18 -7 8
2 Bulgaria 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
(b) Alternative standing with the runner-up results if Bulgaria manipulates
The changes are indicated with blue color and underlining.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 6 2 2 16 13 3 20
2 Bulgaria 5 1 4 22 18 4 16
3 Sweden 5 1 4 18 14 4 16
4 Netherlands 5 1 4 19 18 1 16
5 Luxembourg 2 3 5 12 18 -6 9
6 Belarus 2 2 6 11 17 -6 8
2 Bulgaria 4 1 3 20 16 4 13
The final standing with the hypothetical results are shown in Table 2.a.
On the basis of final standing in Groups B–I and Table 2.a, the runners-up are ranked
in Table 3.a. Since only the eight best second-placed teams advance to the play-offs,
Bulgaria would be eliminated.
However, consider what happens if Bulgaria plays a draw of 1-1 against Luxembourg on
the last matchday. According to Table 2.b, while this change worsens Bulgaria’s standing
in the group, it remains the runner-up with 16 points as both Bulgaria and Sweden would
have the same goal difference (+4) with Bulgaria scoring more goals in all group matches
(22 vs. 18).6 On the other hand, Luxembourg would overtake Belarus thanks to its newly
obtained draw because it would have more points (9 vs. 8).
In the ranking of the second-placed teams, the matches played against the last-placed
team are discarded. Consequently, Bulgaria would have 13 points, placing it fifth among
the runners-up as presented in Table 3.b. Thus Bulgaria would advance to the play-offs
instead of Slovakia if it would concede a goal against Luxembourg.
6 Currently, UEFA prefers using head-to-head results instead of goal difference for breaking ties in the
number of points. While this might have some influence, for example, on the probability that the relative
ranking of two teams depends on a match in which neither team is involved (Berker, 2014), the choice of
tie-breaking rules does not affect the essence of our example.
6
Table 3: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)—Ranking of second-placed teams
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Lost; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points.
Since matches played against the sixth-placed team in each group are discarded (FIFA, 2017b), all teams
have played eight matches taken into account.
(a) Baseline scenario
Pos Team Group W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Switzerland B 7 0 1 18 6 12 21
2 Italy G 5 2 1 12 8 4 17
3 Denmark E 4 2 2 13 6 7 14
4 Croatia I 4 2 2 8 4 4 14
5 Northern Ireland C 4 1 3 10 6 4 13
6 Greece H 3 4 1 9 5 4 13
7 Republic of Ireland D 3 4 1 7 5 2 13
8 Slovakia F 4 0 4 11 6 5 12
9 Bulgaria A 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
(b) Alternative scenario if Bulgaria manipulates
The changes are indicated with blue color and underlining.
Pos Team Group W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Switzerland B 7 0 1 18 6 12 21
2 Italy G 5 2 1 12 8 4 17
3 Denmark E 4 2 2 13 6 7 14
4 Croatia I 4 2 2 8 4 4 14
5 Bulgaria A 4 1 3 20 16 4 13
6 Northern Ireland C 4 1 3 10 6 4 13
7 Greece H 3 4 1 9 5 4 13
8 Republic of Ireland D 3 4 1 7 5 2 13
9 Slovakia F 4 0 4 11 6 5 12
Note that a successful manipulation has three requirements: (1) the ranking criteria
(number of points, goal difference, etc.) of a team should be better among the runners-up
by exerting a lower effort in a match; (2) it should preserve the position of the manipulating
team in its group; (3) it needs to result in a potential gain for this team with respect to
qualification, for example, by advancing it to the play-offs instead of being eliminated.
Otherwise, it makes no sense to exert a lower effort. A situation that occurred in the
UEFA European Championship 1996 qualification tournament has satisfied only the first
two conditions (Csato´, 2018).
3 Theoretical background
In the following, an abstract model is built for the home-and-away (double) round-robin
group stage of a tournament designed similarly to the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
tournament (UEFA). It begins with several definitions for the sake of accurateness. We
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will see in the next section that the seemingly long preparation for the main theorems
does not affect the generality of the results. For example, it is not required that a win is
awarded by three points, a draw is awarded by one point, and a loss is awarded by zero
points.
Definition 3.1. Round-robin group: The pair (𝑋,𝑆) is a round-robin group where
∙ 𝑋 is a finite set of at least two teams;
∙ the ranking method 𝑆 associates a strict order 𝑆(𝑣) on the set 𝑋 for any function
𝑣 : 𝑋 × 𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N ∪ {0}} ∪ {—} such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if and
only if 𝑥 = 𝑦.
In a round-robin group, any team plays each other team in 𝑋 once at home and once
at away (the home team and the away team is defined even if the match is played on a
neutral field). Function 𝑣 describes game results with the number of goals scored by the
home and the away team, respectively.
Let (𝑋,𝑆) be a round-robin group, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 be two teams, and 𝑣 be a set of
results. 𝑥 is ranked higher (lower) than 𝑦 if and only if 𝑥 is preferred to 𝑦 by 𝑆(𝑣), that is,
𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦 (𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦). Consider 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦); 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)), where 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) is the number
of goals scored by the home team 𝑥 against the away team 𝑦, and 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) is the number of
goals scored by the away team 𝑦 against the home team 𝑥. It is said that team 𝑥 wins over
team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away), team 𝑥 loses to team 𝑦
if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away) and team 𝑥 draws against team
𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥).
Definition 3.2. Number of points: Let (𝑋,𝑆) be a round-robin group, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team,
𝑣 be a set of results, and 𝛼 > 𝛽 > 𝛾 be three parameters. Denote by 𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) the number
of wins, by 𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) the number of draws, and by 𝑁 ℓ𝑣(𝑥) the number of losses of team 𝑥,
respectively. The number of points of team 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) + 𝛽𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) + 𝛾𝑁 ℓ𝑣(𝑥).
In other words, a win means 𝛼 points, a draw means 𝛽 points and a loss means 𝛾
points.
Remark 3.1. For the sake of simplicity, in the following, we will use the notation (𝑋,𝑆)
for a round-robin group (𝑋,𝑆) with the parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾. Furthermore, it is assumed
that 𝛼 > 𝛽 > 𝛾.
Definition 3.3. Monotonicity of the ranking in a round-robin group: Let (𝑋,𝑆) be a
round-robin group. Its ranking method is called monotonic if 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) implies
𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦 for any teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 and for any set of results 𝑣.
Monotonicity does not necessarily lead to a unique ranking, tie-breaking rules can be
arbitrary in the model.
Definition 3.4. Group-based qualifier : A group-based qualifier 𝒯 consists of 𝑘 round-robin
groups (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆𝑖), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 such that 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑗 = ∅ for any 𝑖 ̸= 𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘.
To cover the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA), it is allowed to
compare teams from different groups in the repechage group.
Definition 3.5. Repechage function: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier. For any set of
group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
, a repechage function 𝒢 associates
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∙ a set of teams 𝒢1(𝑉 ) ⊆ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 composing the repechage group;
∙ a set of opponents ∅ ≠ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ⊆ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} for each team in the repechage group
𝑥 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ); and
∙ a repechage ranking 𝑄(𝑉 ), which is a strict order 𝑄(𝑉 ) on the set 𝒢1(𝑉 ).
Definition 3.6. Impartiality of a repechage function: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier.
Repechage function 𝒢 is impartial if for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘:
a) |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| = 𝑐𝑖, the number of teams from the round-robin group (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆𝑖) in the
repechage group, does not depend on the set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
;
b) 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) implies 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) and 𝑥 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑦);
c) if 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), then 𝑧 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥), 𝑧 ̸= 𝑦 implies 𝑧 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑦); and
d) 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) implies |𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥)| = |𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑦)|.
According to the impartiality of a repechage function: a) the number of teams trans-
ferred to the repechage group from a given group is fixed; b) if two teams in the repechage
group have played against each other, then these matches are considered in the repechage
group; c) if two teams are transferred to the repechage group from the same group, then
their matches played against any third team should be uniformly considered or discarded
in the repechage group; and d) the number of matches taken into account for the repechage
group is the same for all teams in the repechage group. The last condition ensures that
the number of points is a plausible measure of performance in the repechage group.
Definition 3.7. Number of points in the repechage group: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier
and 𝒢 be a repechage function. The number of points in the repechage group of team
𝑥 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) is:
𝑠𝑘+1𝒢(𝑉 )(𝑥) = 𝛼
(︁⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) or 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁⃒⃒⃒)︁
+
+𝛽
(︁⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) or 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁⃒⃒⃒)︁
+
+𝛾
(︁⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) or 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁⃒⃒⃒)︁
.
Thus the number of points in the repechage group is calculated on the basis of the
matches considered there.
Definition 3.8. Monotonicity of a repechage function: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier
and 𝒢 be a repechage function. Repechage function 𝒢 is said to be monotonic if 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢(𝑉 )(𝑥) >
𝑠𝑘+1𝒢(𝑉 )(𝑦) implies 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦 for any teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) and any set of group results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
.
Definition 3.9. Allocation rule: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier and 𝒢 be a repechage
function. For any set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
, an allocation rule 𝒢 associates
a value from the set {0; 1; 2} for all teams 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖.
Consider a group-based qualifier 𝒯 , a repechage function 𝒢, an allocation rule ℛ, and
a set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
. Team 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 is said to be: (a) directly
qualified if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2; (b) advanced to the next round (with a chance to qualify) if
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 1; and (c) eliminated if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0.
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Definition 3.10. Groups-based qualification system: The triple (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) of a group-based
qualifier 𝒯 , a repechage function 𝒢, and an allocation rule ℛ is a group-based qualification
system.
The outcome of any group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) is given by the allocation
rule ℛ, which implies the following.
Remark 3.2. Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a group-based qualification system. If there is no difference
in the allocation of teams in the repechage group, that is, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦) for all
teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) under any set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
, then the group-
based qualification system can be equivalently described without a repechage group, thus
𝒢1(𝑉 ) = ∅ can be assumed without loss of generality.
Definition 3.11. Monotonicity of a group-based qualification system: Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a
group-based qualification system. It is called monotonic if under any set of group results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
:
∙ there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑖 for each round-robin group
(𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆𝑖) such that 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 impliesℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦) for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘;
∙ the repechage function 𝒢 impartial and monotonic such that 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦 implies
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦) for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ).
The idea behind a monotonic group-based qualification system is straightforward.
Because of the application of a monotonic group ranking, teams have no incentive to
exert a lower effort in any match as they cannot achieve a higher position in their
group by deliberately playing worse. Impartiality of the repechage function provides the
comparability of the results taken into account for the repechage group, where the ranking
ensures incentive compatibility, too.
Proposition 3.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA), discussed in
Section 2, fits into the model presented above: it is a monotonic group-based qualification
system.
Proof. There are 𝑘 = 9 groups and all criteria of Definition 3.11 hold:
∙ the common group ranking 𝑆 is monotonic because the number of points is the
first tie-breaker in the groups (Definition 3.3), and:
◇ the first-placed team in each group qualifies: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2 for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖
if and only if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 0;
◇ the third-, fourth-, fifth- and sixth-placed teams in each group are elim-
inated: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 2;
∙ the repechage function 𝒢 is impartial (Definition 3.6):
◇ the repechage group consists of the runners-up: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∩𝒢1(𝑉 ), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 9
if and only if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1, so |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| = 1;
◇ the eight matches played against the first five teams of the group are
considered in the repechage group: for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 9,
𝑧 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) if and only if 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≤ 4;
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∙ the repechage function 𝒢 is monotonic because the number of points is the first
tie-breaker in the repechage group (Definition 3.8), and:
◇ the eight best second-placed teams advance to the next round: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) =
1 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) and
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑦 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≤ 7; and
◇ the lowest-ranked second-placed team is eliminated: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 if
𝑥 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) and 𝑦 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑥 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) ∖ {𝑥}.
Now we turn to the issue of incentive compatibility.
Definition 3.12. Manipulation: Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a group-based qualification system. A
team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 can manipulate the qualification system if there exist two sets
of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that
𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) ≤ 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, furthermore, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) < ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
To summarise, manipulation means that team 𝑥 improves its status with respect to
qualification by letting one of its opponents to score more goals.
Definition 3.13. Strategy-proofness of a group-based qualification system: A group-based
qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) is called strategy-proof if there exists no set of group results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
under which a team 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate.
Another notion is needed to formulate the theoretical results.
Definition 3.14. Permutation of results in a group: Let 𝒯 be a group-based qualifier and
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
be a set of group results. Consider a round-robin group (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆𝑖),
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, and a permutation 𝜎 : 𝑋 𝑖 → 𝑋 𝑖. Permutation of results in a group leads to the
set of group results
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝜎(𝑣)𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that 𝜎(𝑣)𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑖 (𝜎−1(𝑥), 𝜎−1(𝑦))
for all teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖.
Permutation of group results is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.1. Consider the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), which is a
(monotonic) group-based qualification system according to Proposition 3.1, and the set of
group results 𝑉 given by the actual results in Groups B–I and the hypothetical group results
in Group A according to Table 1. Let 𝜎 be the permutation such that 𝜎(France) = Sweden,
𝜎(Sweden) = Netherlands, and 𝜎(Netherlands) = France, while 𝜎(𝑦) = 𝑦 for all teams
𝑦 /∈ {France, Netherlands, Sweden}. Then France would have the same results under 𝜎(𝑉 )
as Sweden has under 𝑉 , Sweden would have the same results under 𝜎(𝑉 ) as Netherlands
has under 𝑉 , and Netherlands would have the same results under 𝜎(𝑉 ) as France has under
𝑉 . Consequently, Netherlands would qualify under 𝜎(𝑉 ) as the group winner, France
would have a goal difference of +4, and Sweden would have a goal difference of +1 with
16 points (see Table 2.a).
Our main contribution concerns the strategy-proofness of a monotonic group-based
qualification system, summarised in Figure 1.
Theorem 3.1. Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a monotonic group-based qualification system such that
at least one of the following conditions hold for all round-robin groups (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘:
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Does there exist a team relegated
to the repechage group?
Does the set of matches carried over to the
repechage group depend on the results?
Does the set of matches carried over
to the repechage group depend
only on the group ranking?
Does there exist a team relegated to the
repechage group such that a proper
nonempty subset of its matches played
against both higher- and lower-ranked teams
is carried over to the repechage group?
The strategy-proofness of a monotonic group-based qualification system
(The conditions should be checked separately for each group)
Strategy-proof
(Theorem 3.1, Condition a))
Strategy-proof
(Theorem 3.1, Condition b))
Both situations possible
(Proposition 3.2)
(uninteresting case in practice)
Manipulable
(Theorem 3.2)
Strategy-proof
(Theorem 3.1, Condition c))
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes
No
Figure 1: A summary of the main result
a) no team is transferred to the repechage group: |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| = 0;
b) for each team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), its set of matches considered in the repechage
group is independent of the set of group results 𝑉 : 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝒢2(𝜎(𝑉 ), 𝑥) for any
permutation of results in this group 𝜎 that satisfies 𝑥 ∈ (𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) ∩ 𝒢1(𝜎(𝑉 )));
c) for each team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∩𝒢1(𝑉 ), its set of matches considered in the repechage group
depends only on the group ranking and either all or none of its matches played
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against both higher- and lower-ranked teams are considered in the repechage group
under any set of group results 𝑉 : 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥) = 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥) if 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 implies 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖)
𝑧 for any sets of group results 𝑉 , 𝑉 and for all teams 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, furthermore,
𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 implies 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) or 𝑦 /∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥), and 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 implies 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥)
or 𝑦 /∈ 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) for all teams 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖.
Then this group-based qualification system is strategy-proof.
See Remark 3.2 for the first condition. According to the second requirement, if a
permutation of group results does not affect the relegation of a given team to the repechage
group, then its set of matches carried over to the repechage group should remain the same.
The last condition of Theorem 3.1 means that all or none of matches played against higher-
and lower-ranked teams should be considered in the repechage group.
Proof. a) The monotonicity of the group ranking 𝑆 provides incentive compatibility.
b) Since 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥) for team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) under any sets of group results
𝑉, 𝑉 , incentive compatibility is provided by the monotonicity of the group ranking 𝑆 and
the repechage function 𝒢.
c) In this case, the team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) cannot change the set of its matches to be
discarded in the repechage group, therefore incentive compatibility is provided by the
monotonicity of the group ranking 𝑆 and repechage function 𝒢.
The message of Theorem 3.1 in practice will be discussed later.
Theorem 3.2. Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a monotonic group-based qualification system such that
the following conditions hold for at least one round-robin group (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘:
a) a team is transferred to the repechage group: |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| > 0;7
b) for each team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), its set of matches considered in the repechage
group depends only on the group ranking: 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥) = 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥) if 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 implies
𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 for any sets of group results 𝑉 , 𝑉 and all teams 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖; and
c) there exists a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) such that a proper nonempty subset of
its matches played against higher- or lower-ranked teams are considered in the
repechage group under any set of group results 𝑉 :
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁
, or
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
.
Then this group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) violates strategy-proofness.
The requirements of Theorem 3.2 are outlined in Figure 1, too, as this result runs
parallel with Theorem 3.1.
No formal proof is given for Theorem 3.2, but an example with a group of four teams
is provided, where the second-placed team can manipulate.
7 According to Remark 3.2, this implies that there is a difference in the allocation of teams from the
repechage group: if 𝑥 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), then there exists at least one team 𝑦 ∈ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) such that ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ̸= ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦).
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Table 4: The group of Example 3.2
The runner-up is transferred to the repechage group.
The home team is in the row, the result of the match is given from its point of view.
(a) A situation susceptible to manipulation
if the matches played against the third-
placed team count (Case II ), or the
matches played against the fourth-placed
team are discarded (Case VI ) in the re-
pechage group
Team A B C D
A — draw win win
B win — win draw
C loss loss — win
D loss win draw —
(b) A situation susceptible to manipulation
if the matches played against the fourth-
placed team count (Case III ), or the
matches played against the third-placed
team are discarded (Case V ) in the re-
pechage group
Team A B C D
A — win win win
B win — win win
C draw loss — win
D loss win draw —
Example 3.2. Let 𝑋 𝑖 = {𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷}. Consider the monotonic group-based qualification
system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∩𝒢1(𝑉 ) if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1, therefore the runner-
up is transferred to the repechage group. Since there is a difference in the allocation of
teams in the repechage group (the first requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds), the results in
other groups can be chosen such that the second-placed team can manipulate if its number
of points considered in the repechage group increases.
Let 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ). The following cases are possible as the second condition of
Theorem 3.2 holds:
I. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 0
}︁
, that is, only the matches played
against the top team count in the repechage group.
Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness.
Note that(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁)︁
=
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁
, and(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
= ∅,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 does not hold.
II. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 2
}︁
, that is, only the matches played
against the third-placed team count in the repechage group.
Consider the results 𝑣𝑖 given in Table 4.a. The number of points are 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) =
4𝛼+𝛽+ 𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐵) = 3𝛼+2𝛽+ 𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐶) = 𝛼+𝛽+4𝛾, and 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐷) = 𝛼+2𝛽+3𝛾,
hence 𝐴 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐵 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐷 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐶 due to the monotonicity of the group ranking
𝑆. Furthermore, team 𝐵 has 𝛽 + 𝛾 points in the repechage group.
However, if 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 except for 𝑣𝑖(𝐵,𝐶) = {loss} instead of 𝑣𝑖(𝐵,𝐶) = {win},
then 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) = 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) = 4𝛼+ 𝛽 + 𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐵) = 2𝛼+ 2𝛽 + 2𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐶) = 2𝛼+ 𝛽 + 3𝛾,
and 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐷) = 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐷) = 𝛼 + 2𝛽 + 3𝛾, hence 𝐴 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐵 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐶 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐷 due to
the monotonicity of the group ranking 𝑆. Now team 𝐵 has 𝛼 + 𝛾 > 𝛽 + 𝛾 points
in the repechage group, therefore it can manipulate.
Note that
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
14
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
III. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 3
}︁
, that is, only the matches played
against the fourth-placed team count in the repechage group.
Consider the results 𝑣𝑖 given in Table 4.b. The number of points are 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) =
4𝛼+ 𝛽 + 𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐵) = 4𝛼+ 2𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐶) = 𝛼+ 2𝛽 + 3𝛾, and 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐷) = 𝛼+ 𝛽 + 4𝛾,
hence 𝐴 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐵 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐶 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐷 due to the monotonicity of the group ranking
𝑆. Furthermore, team 𝐵 has 𝛼 + 𝛾 points in the repechage group.
However, if 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 except for 𝑣𝑖(𝐵,𝐷) = {loss} instead of 𝑣𝑖(𝐵,𝐷) = {win}, then
𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) = 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐴) = 4𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐵) = 3𝛼 + 3𝛾, 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐶) = 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐶) = 𝛼 + 2𝛽 + 3𝛾,
and 𝑠𝑣𝑖(𝐷) = 2𝛼 + 𝛽 + 3𝛾, hence 𝐴 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐵 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐷 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝐶 due to the
monotonicity of the group ranking 𝑆. Now team 𝐵 has 2𝛼 > 𝛼 + 𝛾 points in the
repechage group, therefore it can manipulate.
Note that
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
IV. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} ∖
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 0
}︁
, that is, the matches
played against the top team are discarded in the repechage group.
Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness.
Note that (︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁)︁
= ∅, and(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
=
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 does not hold.
V. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} ∖
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 2
}︁
, that is, the matches
played against the third-placed team are discarded in the repechage group.
Consider the results 𝑣𝑖 given in Table 4.b and the alternative results 𝑣𝑖 from
Case III . The analysis of Case III remains valid, and team 𝐵 has 2𝛼 + 2𝛾 points
under 𝑣𝑖 and 3𝛼+𝛾 points under 𝑣𝑖 in the repechage group, respectively, therefore
it can manipulate.
Note that
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
VI. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} ∖
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 3
}︁
, that is, the matches
played against the fourth-placed team are discarded in the repechage group.
Consider the results 𝑣𝑖 given in Table 4.a and the alternative results 𝑣𝑖 from
Case II . The analysis of Case II remains valid, and team 𝐵 has 𝛼+2𝛽 + 𝛾 points
under 𝑣𝑖 and 2𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 points under 𝑣𝑖 in the repechage group, respectively,
therefore it can manipulate.
Note that
∅ ≠
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
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VII. 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥}, that is, no matches are discarded in the repechage group.
Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness.
Note that(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁)︁
=
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁
, and(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
=
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
,
thus the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 does not hold.
Strategy-proofness is guaranteed by monotonicity for a group of two teams. Manipula-
tion in a group of three teams can be presented after considering other tie-breaking rules
but this is left to the reader.
Nevertheless, this remains an uninteresting case in practice since discarding the matches
against an opponent if there are only two of them can hardly be justified. Although, for
instance, the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League C is a tournament containing a group of three
teams and a repechage group, some matches are ignored only in groups of four teams for
the ranking of third-placed teams in the repechage group.
It is clear that the number of teams in the group, as well as the position of the team
transferred to the repechage group, can be modified in Example 3.2 without changing
the essence of the proof. Furthermore, if other tie-breaking rules are introduced in
Definitions 3.3 and 3.8, then 𝛼 = 𝛽 (a win and a draw have the same worth) or 𝛽 = 𝛾 (a
draw and a loss have the same worth) can be allowed, although this is probably unimportant
for most sports.
Based on Figure 1, a “gap” can be identified between Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 when the
set of matches carried over to the repechage group depends on the results, but not only on
the group ranking. While such a group-based qualification system is rather theoretical, it
reveals the richness of the model contrary to its seemingly restrictive conditions.
Proposition 3.2. Let (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) be a monotonic group-based qualification system. Consider
a round-robin group (𝑋 𝑖, 𝑆), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, where the following conditions hold:
∙ a team is transferred to the repechage group: |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| > 0;
∙ there exists a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∩𝒢1(𝑉 ) such that its set of matches considered in the re-
pechage group depends on the set of group results 𝑉 : 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ̸= 𝒢2(𝜎(𝑉 ), 𝑥) for at
least one permutation of group results 𝜎 that satisfies 𝑥 ∈ (𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) ∩ 𝒢1(𝜎(𝑉 )));
and
∙ there exists a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) such that its set of matches considered in the
repechage group does not depend only on the group ranking: there exist sets of
group results 𝑉, 𝑉 with 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 implying 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 for all teams 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 but
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ̸= 𝒢2(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Then it is uncertain whether this group-based qualification system is strategy-proof or not.
An example is provided for both cases.
Example 3.3. It basically follows the monotonic group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ)
of Example 3.2 with 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 0
}︁
(Case I ), thus only
the matches played against the top team count in the repechage group. However, if there
exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 such that 𝑣𝑖1(𝑧, 𝑦) > 𝑣𝑖1(𝑧, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖2(𝑧, 𝑦) < 𝑣𝑖1(𝑧, 𝑦) for all 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∖{𝑦}
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(team 𝑦 loses all of its matches), then 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 3
}︁
,
hence only the matches played against the fourth-placed team count in the repechage
group.
The monotonic group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) of Example 3.3 is incentive
compatible. First, if only the matches played against the top team count in the repechage
group (consequently, there exists no team losing all of its matches), then 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) cannot
be modified by the second-placed team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 through exerting a lower effort. Second, if
the matches played against the fourth-placed team, which loses all of its matches, count in
the repechage group, then the second-placed team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 has no incentive to manipulate
because it carries over the maximal number of points 2𝛼 to the repechage group.
Example 3.4. It basically follows the monotonic group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ)
of Example 3.2 with 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) = 𝑋 𝑖∖{𝑥}∖
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 3
}︁
(Case VI ),
that is, the matches played against the fourth-placed team are discarded in the re-
pechage group. However, if there exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 such that 𝑣𝑖1(𝑧, 𝑦) < 𝑣𝑖2(𝑧, 𝑦)
and 𝑣𝑖2(𝑧, 𝑦) > 𝑣𝑖1(𝑧, 𝑦) for all 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑦} (team 𝑦 wins all of its matches), then
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≤ 2
}︁
, hence the matches played against the
top team are discarded in the repechage group.
The monotonic group-based qualification system (𝒯 ,𝒢,ℛ) of Example 3.4 can be
manipulated similarly to Case VI in the proof of Theorem 3.2 because no team has won
all of its matches there.
Note that—despite the different setting considered—a similar gray zone emerges
in the analysis of tournament systems consisting of multiple round-robin and knock-
out tournaments with noncumulative prizes as illustrated by Dagaev and Sonin (2018,
Example 4).
Corollary 3.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA) is incentive
incompatible.
Proof. The scenario presented in Example 2.1 shows that team Bulgaria = 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋1
can manipulate because there exist sets of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} and 𝑉 =
{𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} such that 𝑣1 = 𝑣1 except for 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥) = 1 > 0 = 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥), where team
Luxembourg = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋1 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 < 1 = ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Theorem 3.2 can also be applied due to Proposition 3.1. The group-based qualific-
ation system of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA) is mono-
tonic, |𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 )| = 1 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) can be 0 or 1 for team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) in the
repechage group. Furthermore, for each team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝒢1(𝑉 ), 𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) depends only
on the group ranking, and, finally, ∅ ̸=
(︁
𝒢2(𝑉, 𝑥) ∩
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁)︁
⊂{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ 𝒢1(𝑉 ) : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁
under any set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
.
Theorem 3.2 proves the incentive incompatibility of the 2014 FIFA World Cup quali-
fication tournament (UEFA), too, which has already been shown in Dagaev and Sonin
(2013).
Remark 3.3. The allocation rule ℛ of the model above does not distinguish between teams
advancing to the subsequent round. This holds if the next round is seeded randomly
(like in the UEFA Euro 2000 qualifying tournament), or on the basis of an exogenous
team ranking that cannot be manipulated by exerting a lower effort in some matches (like
FIFA World Rankings used in the case of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament
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(UEFA)). However, if, for example, the highest-ranked teams in the repechage group
are placed in the first pot before the seeding (like in the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying
tournament), then the ranking in the repechage group count, and a successful tanking can
reduce the expected strength of the opponents in the next stage.
4 Implications
It is known from Dagaev and Sonin (2013) and Corollary 3.1, respectively, that the 2014 and
2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournaments (UEFA) do not satisfy strategy-proofness.
Further qualification tournaments to the recent FIFA World Cups in the European Zone
(World Cup (UEFA)) and UEFA European Championships (UEFA Euro) are analysed
from this point of view in Table 5.
The UEFA European Championship has been held every four years since 1960. The
qualification systems for the tournaments between 1960 and 1992 can be described without
a repechage group, thus they were strategy-proof due to condition a) of Theorem 3.1.
The same result provides the incentive compatibility of the 2004 and 2008 qualifying
tournament, where teams from different groups had not to be compared.
The UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament is linked with the 2018-19 UEFA Nations
League and gives teams a secondary route to qualify for the final tournament through the
qualifying play-offs. This format is not covered by our theoretical model. However, it is
also incentive incompatible according to Dagaev and Sonin (2018, Proposition 2) since the
qualifying system essentially consists of two parallel round-robin tournaments, therefore a
team might be strictly better off by creating a vacant slot in the qualifying play-offs.8
The first incentive incompatible FIFA World Cup qualifier in the European zone was
the 1998 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA). The 2002 FIFA World Cup
qualification tournament (UEFA) again satisfied strategy-proofness due to the lack of a
repechage group (see condition a) of Theorem 3.1).
Even though the 1990 and 1994 FIFA World Cup qualification tournaments (UEFA)
were incentive compatible, their fairness remains questionable: the second-placed teams
qualified automatically only from certain groups in the first case, and all second-placed
teams qualified but group sizes varied in the second case (some qualification tournaments
before the 1990 event suffered from the same problem). It is clear that incentive compat-
ibility is a narrower concept than fairness, see Guyon (2018) for an examination of the
latter through the example of the 2016 UEFA European Championship. Hence, one can
even say that the organisers sacrificed fairness for the sake of strategy-proofness.
Proposition 4.1. Qualification tournaments for the 1996, 2000, 2012 and 2016 UEFA
European Championships as well as for the 1998, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 FIFA World
Cups in the European Zone were incentive incompatible.
Proof. It immediately follows from Theorem 3.2 (see Table 5).
The list is far from exhaustive. For example, the elite round of the 2016 UEFA European
Under-17 Championship qualification tournament and the 2017 UEFA European Under-21
8 There is a debate around tanking in the UEFA Nations League, see at https://www.reddit.
com/r/soccer/comments/75vrcm/tanking_in_the_uefa_nations_league_wont_benefit/ and http:
//www.football-rankings.info/2017/07/uefa-nations-league-losing-could.html. However, it
focuses on the observation that dropping to a lower-ranked league could substantially improve the chances
of qualifying through the play-offs, an unfair gain only in terms of expected probability (Csato´, 2020).
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Championship should be paid special attention because they may inspire academic research
in the future.
It is also worth noting that all incentive incompatible qualifiers of Table 5 discard some
matches in the repechage group, which is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition of
violating strategy-proofness as Figure 1 shows.
Proposition 4.1 carries a disconcerting message for the administrators of FIFA and
UEFA as they could be responsible for a potential scandal occurring in a recent qualification
tournament. The example of Section 2 would be especially disturbing because Luxembourg
would have practically no incentive to interfere with the manipulation of Bulgaria and
to prevent the elimination of Montenegro. Furthermore, Luxembourg might have even
been interested in scoring a goal to obtain the fifth place in the group. Fortunately, such
an outcome did not materialised, and we do not know about any attempt to strategically
manipulate these qualification tournaments in the way presented above.
5 Strategy-proof mechanisms
Nevertheless, the absence of dishonest behaviour in the history of qualification tournaments
does not reduce the importance of strategy-proofness in practice, especially if it can be
achieved without significant rule changes. For instance, in the 2018 FIFA World Cup
qualification tournament (UEFA), the root of the problem resides in discarding the matches
played against the sixth-placed teams in the comparison of runners-up. The greatest pity
about this situation is that it could have been straightforward to avoid by UEFA ditching
the strange policy of ignoring some group matches since all groups had six teams following
the admission of Gibraltar and Kosovo.
Yet the administrators chose not to modify the rules. According to a UEFA News
(UEFA, 2017), released on 10 October 2017, after the end of group stage: “[. . . ] the exclu-
sion of results against sixth-placed teams was retained to alleviate any possible imbalance
between the qualifying groups caused by the late introductions of Gibraltar and Kosovo”.
While it is respectable to consider some mathematically unprovable imbalances between
the groups, this decision sacrificed the more clear and crucial requirement of incentive
compatibility.
It seems to be necessary to suggest incentive compatible designs in order to argue
against the format of recent qualification tournaments. Denote the number of teams
by 𝑛, and the number of groups by 𝑘. Let 𝑚 ≡ 𝑛 mod 𝑘 such that 0 ≤ 𝑚 < 𝑘 and
ℓ = (𝑛−𝑚)/𝑘 ∈ Z. We are looking for strategy-proof group-based qualification systems
on the basis of Theorem 3.1.
Mechanism A: eliminating the repechage group
The optimal case is to create groups of equal size, like in the UEFA Euro 2004 qualifying
tournament (see Table 5). However, it may conflict with divisibility, this solution cannot
be followed if 𝑚 > 0.
Another possibility is that all second- or third-placed teams either qualify or advance
to the next round regardless of group sizes. For example, the UEFA Euro 2008 qualifying
tournament was strategy-proof as the top two teams in each group qualified, although a
group contained more teams than the others, which may be unfair (see Table 5).
Mechanism A ensures incentive compatibility due to condition a) of Theorem 3.1.
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Since the application of Mechanism A remains questionable if 𝑚 > 0, three other
policies are suggested.
Mechanism B: matches to be discarded in the repechage group
are independent of group results
While social choice theory usually wants to avoid the violation of anonymity at all costs,
it makes sense to consider this solution because of the seeding procedure. If teams are
ranked on an external basis (such as FIFA World Rankings from a given month), there
would be 𝑘 teams in Pot 1, 𝑘 teams in Pot 2, and so on, until Pot ℓ with 𝑘 +𝑚 (as in the
UEFA Euro 2008 qualifying tournament) or Pot ℓ+ 1 with 𝑚 (as in the 2018 FIFA World
Cup qualification tournament (UEFA)) teams is formed. Remember that 0 < 𝑘 < 𝑚.
Since the last pot is responsible for the difference of group sizes, it could be fair to discard
the matches played against the team(s) from the last pot in the repechage group.
Nevertheless, a problem may arise when a team from the last pot is transferred to the
repechage group due to its unexpectedly good performance in the qualifiers.9 The scenario
can be immediately addressed by discarding the matches played against the team from
the penultimate pot for this particular team, which does not affect strategy-proofness.
Mechanism B provides incentive compatibility due to condition b) of Theorem 3.1.
For the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA), this regime means
fixing in advance that matches played against the teams in Pot 6 (Luxembourg, Andorra,
San Marino, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Liechtenstein, as well as the lately introduced
Gibraltar and Kosovo) are ignored in the comparison of the runners-up. Since only Luxem-
bourg and Georgia obtained a better (the fifth) position in the qualification tournament,
this policy does not make much difference in practice. However, while it is attractive from
a theoretical point of view, ethical concerns may arise.
Mechanism C : all or no matches played against higher- and lower-
ranked teams are considered in the repechage group
If group sizes vary because of 𝑚 > 0, and the 𝑝th-placed teams of the groups are considered
in the repechage group, then only their matches played against higher-ranked teams can
count in the repechage group as the cardinality of the set of teams that are ranked lower
than the 𝑝th-placed teams in the groups is different. It means no problem when:
a) The qualification tournament is centred around relegation: in the 2018-19 UEFA
Nations League C, 15 teams are divided into one group of three teams and
three groups of four teams each such that the three fourth-placed and the worse
third-placed teams are relegated to League D, at least according to the original
intention of the UEFA. In the comparison of the third-placed teams, only the
matches played against the first- and second-placed teams in the group count.
Since there is at most one team ranked lower than the team transferred to the
repechage group in each group, they cannot manipulate by changing their set of
matches to be ignored.
9 We are grateful to De´nes Pa´lvo¨lgyi for spotting this issue.
One of the greatest surprises of this type occurred in the 2016 UEFA Euro qualifying tournament when
Greece finished as the last-placed team in Group F despite being drawn from Pot 1.
21
b) A high proportion of participating teams qualify: in the 2018 European Men’s
Handball Championship Qualification Phase 2, the contestants were split into
seven groups of four teams each such that the top two ranked teams from each
group and the best third-placed team qualified for the final tournament. In the
comparison of third-placed teams, only the matches played against the teams
ranked first and second in the group was considered.
Mechanism C provides incentive compatibility due to condition c) of Theorem 3.1.
This policy has guaranteed the strategy-proofness of the 2016 UEFA European Cham-
pionship with uniform group sizes (Guyon, 2018), too, where third-placed teams were
ranked on the basis of all group matches.
Mechanism D: new seeding policy
The idea behind mechanism C can be applied with a slight modification of the seeding
procedure, by using a bottom-up design of the pots instead of the usual top-down approach.
First, the worst 𝑘 teams form Pot ℓ+1, the next 𝑘 teams Pot ℓ, and so on until Pot 1 with
𝑚 teams is formed, where 0 < 𝑚 < 𝑘. Then 𝑚 groups are created by drawing a team from
each pot, and 𝑘−𝑚 groups are created by drawing a team from each pot except for Pot 1.
The top 𝑝 teams qualify from the 𝑚 groups of size ℓ+ 1, and the top 𝑝− 1 teams qualify
from the 𝑘 −𝑚 groups of size ℓ. The repechage group consists of the (𝑝 + 1)th-placed
teams from the 𝑚 groups of size ℓ+ 1, and the 𝑝th-placed teams from the 𝑘−𝑚 groups of
size ℓ, where they are compared on the basis of their matches played against the ℓ − 𝑝
teams that are ranked lower in their groups. Consequently, the matches played against
the already qualified teams are discarded in the repechage group, which seems to be a
reasonable policy.
Mechanism D provides incentive compatibility due to condition c) of Theorem 3.1.
Further solutions
Some other designs can guarantee strategy-proofness. For example, the format of the 1990
FIFA World Cup qualification tournament (UEFA) can be followed without discarding
any matches. It means that: (1) the directly qualified runners-up or third-placed teams
are chosen from the groups containing more teams, or (2) the eliminated runners-up or
third-placed teams are chosen from the groups containing more teams. However, this
solution seems to be dishonest as discussed in Section 4.
It is also possible to organise a preliminary round for lower-ranked teams, either a
round-robin such as in the CEV qualification tournament for the 2018 FIVB Volleyball
Men’s World Championship, or a two-leg playoff, similarly to the 2018 FIFA World Cup
qualification tournament—AFC First Round. Note that the match calendar is less crowded
for lower-ranked teams because they normally do not qualify for major tournaments.
Another solution might be reducing the number of contestants to achieve equal group
sizes. For instance, the weakest teams (e.g. Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, San Marino, etc.) can
be placed into a special group, where they play against each other without the possibility
of direct qualification. The winner of this group may advance to a play-off with the
best runner-up or third-placed team. Besides excluding manipulation, this policy has the
further benefit of giving a chance for lower-ranked national teams, mainly composed of
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amateur players, to compete against each other and enjoy more success than scoring some
lucky goals against professional sportsmen.10
Assessment
To summarise, it is clear that mechanism A is perfect in the case of 𝑚 = 0 but its fairness
remains questionable if 𝑛 is not divisible by 𝑘.
Mechanism C leads to discarding a high proportion of matches in the repechage group
for the qualification tournaments presented in Table 5, which may result in increased
randomness. It means a problem in qualification for a tournament with huge financial
issues at stake—for example, all teams were guaranteed at least USD 9.5 million each for
their participation in the 2018 FIFA World Cup (FIFA, 2017a).
Consequently, we propose to apply mechanisms B or D if uniform group size cannot be
achieved. Both are general, that is, they can be directly applied for arbitrary values of 𝑘
and 𝑛, and they coincide with mechanism A if 𝑚 = 0.
Finally, note that strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed without some costs. For
example, Mechanism B requires fixing the team within a group as the one against which
the results will be ignored in the repechage group, therefore some opponents (mainly the
highest-ranked ones) may reduce their effort in those matches. However, no results are
discarded in the group rankings, and this drawback more or less applies to the original
incentive incompatible design, too. Thus, in our opinion, the potential reduction in efforts
compared to the currently used regime is a small price for eliminating the opportunity
that a team might be strictly better off by losing.
6 Conclusions
Tournament organisers may face unpleasant situations when they miss considering strategy-
proofness as such a tanking of a team can easily undermine the integrity of the sport.
We have demonstrated that qualification tournaments for some recent FIFA World Cups
and UEFA European Championships were incentive incompatible, and suggested some
alternative incentive compatible designs. One of the proposals also yields the important
lesson that violating anonymity is not necessarily harmful in mechanism design.
There are at least three possible directions for future research. First, several distinct
tournament formats can be studied from the perspective of strategy-proofness. Second, the
current theory-oriented investigation can be supplemented by estimating the probability
of manipulation with the use of historical and Monte-Carlo simulated data. Finally, the
solutions guaranteeing incentive compatibility can be compared with respect to other
criteria.
Hopefully, this paper reinforces our view that the scientific community and the sports
industry should work more closely together in analysing the effects of potential rules and,
especially, rule changes, even before they are implemented. For example, the governing
10 This idea may have inspired the novel tournament of UEFA Nations League, especially its 2020/21
season, where 48 teams play in three leagues containing four groups of four teams each, while the remaining
seven UEFA national teams form the lowest-ranked League D. A similar mechanism is used in the North,
Central American and Caribbean section of the 2022 FIFA World Cup qualification: the fourth-placed
team in the top-seeded Hexagonal group of six teams plays against the winner of the tournament organised
for the remaining 29 teams to obtain the inter-confederation play-off slot of the Confederation of North,
Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF).
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bodies of major sports may invite academics to identify possible loopholes in proposed
regulations to prevent scandals in the future.
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